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Present Bias and Collective Dynamic Choice in the Lab †
By Matthew O. Jackson and Leeat Yariv *
We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choos-
ing a common consumption stream. We show that with any hetero-
geneity in time preferences, utilitarian aggregation necessitates a 
present bias. In lab experiments three quarters of “social planners” 
exhibited present biases, and less than two percent were time con-
sistent. Roughly a third of subjects acted as if they were pure util-
itarians, and the rest chose as if they also had varying degrees of 
distributional concerns. (JEL C91, D12, D71, D72)
Many important decisions over sequences of consumption or budget allocations 
are made by groups of decision makers: households, political committees, boards 
of firms, or even different motives within one individual. If members of a group dif-
fer in their time preferences, a tension arises when making collective intertemporal 
choices. We explore how this tension distorts collective intertemporal decisions.
Indeed, individuals vary in their time preferences. For example, in most parts 
of the world, women have significantly higher life expectancies than men: in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, current estimated life expectancies are  82 
years for women and  78 for men, with similar numbers of  85 and  79 in France and 
Spain;  74 and  62 in Russia;  76 and  72 in China;  87 and  80 in Japan;  77 and  70 in 
Brazil; and  54 and  52 in South Africa.1 This is amplified by age differences between 
men and women at marriage. In the United States, men are typically several years 
older than their wives.2 When translated into discount factors, this suggests that hus-
bands and wives might discount the value of savings at substantially different rates.
Despite this heterogeneity, the foundations of classical economics assume that 
firms and other organizations act as “representative agents,” and that their behavior 
1 Expectancies are from birth for children born from 2010 to 2015, see the United Nations Statistics Division 
Social Indicators, updated in December 2010, based on data from the World Population Prospects: The 2008 
Revision (CD-ROM Edition), supplemented by official national statistics published in the United Nations 
Demographic Yearbook 2008.
2 Between 1947 and 2010, a groom was, on average,  2.3 years older than his bride (see Drefahl 2010). Browning
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is time consistent. Operationally, individuals, alone and in groups, evaluate streams 
of consumption using an instantaneous utility function and discount each period’s 
instantaneous utility in an exponentially decaying manner. This assumption persists 
even though it was recognized long ago, by Marglin (1963) and Feldstein (1964), 
that it is difficult to derive an aggregate time independent discount rate for a planner 
facing a society of heterogeneous agents. More recently, Gollier and Zeckhauser 
(2005) showed that a representative agent will have a time-varying discount factor 
if there is sufficient uncertainty and heterogeneity in the environment.3
Our Proposition 1 formalizes an intuition seen in the Gollier-Weitzman (2010) 
puzzle. Gollier and Weitzman argue that an appropriate collective discount fac-
tor should exhibit more patience for decisions that are further in the future. Our 
Proposition 1 shows that there is necessarily a present bias in utilitarian decision 
making. Specifically, if members of a group have heterogeneous discount factors, 
then maximizing a weighted sum of their utility functions leads to a present-bias: the 
group will not only prefer early to later consumption, but will also appear increas-
ingly patient as decisions are pushed into the future. In fact, for a uniform distribu-
tion of discount factors in the population, maximizing the sum of utilities translates 
into hyperbolic discounting.
The difficulties of time consistency are not unique to utilitarian weighting. As 
shown by Zuber (2011), having stationary collective preferences over (private) con-
sumption streams requires that all agents have the same discount factor. That result 
does not imply that the same would be true when aggregating preferences over com-
mon consumption streams, as there is less conflict between agents given that all 
prefer more sooner to less later and are consuming the same stream. Nonetheless, 
as we show in a companion paper (Jackson and Yariv 2014), every non-dictatorial 
aggregation method is time inconsistent if there is any discounting heterogeneity 
within the population.
The following simple example illustrates why present-bias is inevitable. Two 
time-consistent individuals, Constantine and Patience, choose their household con-
sumption by maximizing their joint welfare. Constantine has a discount factor of 
0.5, while Patience has a discount factor of  0.8. Both experience identical instanta-
neous utility. When Constantine and Patience are considering  10 utiles today relative 
to  15 utiles tomorrow, they are comparing a total collective utility of  10 + 10 = 20 
with  15(0.8 + 0.5) = 19.5. They therefore jointly choose the immediate  10 utiles. 
Suppose now that Constantine and Patience compare  10 utiles at time  t ≥ 1 and 
15 utiles at time  t + 1. Now, the comparison is between a total collective utility of 
10(0. 8 t + 0. 5 t ) and  15(0. 8 t+1 + 0. 5 t+1 ). For instance, if  t = 1 , the comparison is 
(2000), using Canadian data finds that the wife of a  65 -year-old man would have, on average, an approximately  50 per-
cent longer expected survival horizon than her husband. See also Schaner (2013) for evidence on differences in time 
preferences inside households in Western Kenya. Kuhn (2013) examines household consumption and expenditure data 
to test the theory we provide here, finding that more diverse households suffer more severe time-inconsistency. We 
discuss further related literature below.
3 Recent work in the context of household decisions, such as Bernheim (1999); Browning (2000); Mazzocco 
(2007); Xue (2008); Abdellaoui, l’Haridon, and Paraschiv (2010); and Hertzberg (2012) considers the implications 
of preference heterogeneity on intertemporal consumption decisions under particular aggregation protocols. That 
literature suggests, for instance, that households may have hyperbolic preferences (Hertzberg 2012) and that com-
mitment devices may play a role in determining consumption patterns (in Mazzocco 2007; and Schaner 2012); see 
also Weitzman (2001); Caplin and Leahy (2004); Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005); Jamison and Jamison 
(2011); Farmer and Geanakoplos (2009); and Rode (2011).
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between  13 and  13.35 , and the delayed consumption leads to greater total utility. In 
fact, for any  t ≥ 1, the total utility would be larger from the delayed  consumption of 
15 utiles, but the immediate decision exhibits the reverse. The household’s behavior 
is time-inconsistent and present biased: the household prefers an immediate reward 
of  10 to a delayed reward of  15, but reverses its preference whenever rewards are 
both pushed into the future.
After showing that a present-bias is inevitable when maximizing some weighted 
sum of utilities, we turn to our main focus: a series of laboratory experiments in 
which one subject chooses a consumption stream for other subjects, who differ in 
their discount factors. In other words, subjects make choices as if they are social 
planners aggregating the preferences of several other individuals. Three main 
insights emerge.
	 •	 	Fifty-nine	out	of	60	 subjects	 are	 time	 inconsistent.	Three	quarters	of	 the	
subjects are present-biased, and the remaining time-inconsistent subjects 
exhibit either future bias or situation-based inconsistencies.4
	 •	 	Fitting	collective	utility	functions	for	the	planners	that	combine	utilitarian	
with egalitarian motives enables us to match more than 80 percent of the 38 
choices they each made.
	 •	 	Subjects	differ	and	can	be	classified	according	to	how	they	weight	utilitar-
ian and egalitarian motives. Just under one-third of subjects act as if they are 
pure utilitarians, while the remaining two-thirds act as if they also weight 
inequality (negatively). Subjects who place the greatest weight on equal-
ity exhibit mixed time inconsistencies, and those weighting equality less 
exhibit present bias, with most (about two-thirds of) subjects acting as if 
they weight equality slightly but noticeably.5
Our experiments are based on a (new) method of inducing discounting without 
relying on timing. Instead of delaying payments, we make all payments at the same 
time, but induce discounting via tokens of different types (mimicking dates) and 
then discount the tokens by different amounts. For example, suppose the induced dis-
count factor is  0.9. When choosing a sequence of consumptions of  (200, 50, 100) of 
three respective types of tokens, the subject receives a payment of  200 + 45 + 81 
experimental cents. This method allows us to directly control the discount factor of 
the subjects and avoids confounding factors (e.g., uncertainty) that enter subjects’ 
evaluations of actual delayed payment and are a challenging confound in traditional 
experiments. The trade-off is that although our technique allows us to control and 
impose discount factors, subjects are not facing actual time discounted consump-
tion utilities—so our experiments are a test of how people aggregate sequences of 
payments that involve discounting, but not a direct test of how people behave when 
faced with time-based choices. This also allows us to isolate the aggregation issue 
4 As we show in Jackson and Yariv (2014), other sorts of time inconsistencies are induced by non-utilitarian 
collective decision making. For example, in the decisions studied in the experiments, purely egalitarian motives can 
generate a future bias. Mixed utilitarian and egalitarian motives can generate a combination of present and future 
biased decisions.
5 Those two thirds of the subjects’ choices diverge from a pure utilitarian decision only when the standard devi-
ation in payoffs is more than three times the difference in average payoffs across decisions.
12_A20111429_10412.indd   4186 11/11/14   4:38 PM
4187Jackson and Yariv: Present Bias and collective dYnamic choicevol. 104 no. 12
by imposing actual exponential discounting on the base preferences and then exam-
ine biases that result in the aggregation.
Before turning to the main body of the paper, we make three further remarks. 
First, our results provide a potential explanation for why individual decision mak-
ers may exhibit a present bias: an individual aggregating a group of internal but 
diverse preferences could be time inconsistent. Indeed, time inconsistent models of 
decision-making appear to explain well a variety of real-world phenomena, ranging 
from saving behavior (Laibson 1997 and Beshears et al. 2008) to physical exercise 
(DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006).6 The idea that individuals might be thought of 
as having some internally conflicting preferences appears in a variety of places, pos-
sibly the most related of which is the recent paper by Green and Hojman (2009) that 
provides a welfare analysis using revealed-preferences in such settings.7 A contri-
bution of the current paper is the insight that viewing individuals as non-degenerate 
utilitarian collectives leads necessarily to behaviors exhibiting time inconsistency 
and a present bias.
Second, our experimental analysis is related to that of Engelmann and Strobel 
(2004), who considered allocation decisions in which agents made decisions “behind 
the veil of ignorance.” Their subjects made decisions affecting outcomes for a set 
of possible future roles and were paid according to a randomly selected role. Two 
main differences between our experiments and theirs are as follows. First, our allo-
cations are designed to detect inconsistencies in time preferences and to distinguish 
between their variations (present-bias, future-bias, etc.). Second, we identify prefer-
ences of social planners, rather than general attitudes toward bargaining outcomes, 
and in our setting experimental planners make choices that only affect others.8
Finally, our analysis allows us to estimate the social preferences exhibited by 
different subjects and we see substantial and statistically significant heterogeneity 
in those preferences, including some utilitarian concerns and some equity concerns. 
These illuminate a debate regarding subjects’ utilitarian and egalitarian motives 
(e.g., see Charness and Rabin 2002; Andreoni and Miller 2002; and Fisman, Kariv, 
and Markovits 2007).
6 The full literature documenting time inconsistencies is too vast to cover here. Some seminal references include 
Herrnstein (1961) and Thaler (1981). These phenomena seem fundamental in that they are observed in species 
other than humans as well (e.g., rats and pigeons as in Ainslie 1975 and Rachlin 2000). For some background, see, 
e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002). Behavior nonetheless depends on context: when faced with 
very simple monetary decisions in the lab, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a, b) find that many individuals appear to 
be time consistent.
7 Emerging neuro-scientific evidence suggests that some aggregation of motives that respond differently to 
timed rewards, goes on in an individual’s brain (e.g., see Hare, Camerer, and Rangel 2009; McClure et al. 2004, 
2007; and Glimcher and Rustichini 2004). Notable models with multiple motives of agents include, among others: 
Thaler and Shefrin (1981); O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999); Bernheim and Rangel (2004); Bénabou and Tirole 
(2005); Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2006); Brocas and Carrillo (2008); Fudenberg and Levine (2006); 
Ambrus and Rozen (2014); and Cherepanov, Feddersen, and Sandroni (2013). In many of those settings, differ-
ences in preferences lead to a conflict between, e.g., current and future selves. In contrast, we focus on how multiple 
selves collectively make choices.
8 When agents are randomly paid according to a role as in Engelmann and Strobel (2004), an expected utility 
maximizer would choose alternatives maximizing the sum of expected utilities. Indeed, utilitarian motives appear 
quite strongly in the Engelmann and Strobel experiments. Our design does not necessarily induce utilitarian motives 
as the decision maker is making decisions for others.
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I. The Setting
A set  N = {1, … , n} of agents make a collective decision over streams of con-
sumption. Agents all consume the same stream, denoted by  C = ( c 1 ,  c 2 , ⋯) , where 
each  c t ∈ [0, 1] .9
Agents maximize a time additive discounted utility function. Agent  i has a dis-
count factor  δ i ∈ (0, 1) and an increasing and twice continuously differentiable 
instantaneous utility function  u i : [0, 1] → ℜ such that a stream  C = ( c 1 ,  c 2 , …) 
is evaluated as10
(1)   U i (C) =  ∑ 
t
 δ i tu i ( c t ) . 
Let   denote the set of possible preferences  ( δ i ,  u i ) satisfying the conditions above.11
A society of  n individuals is denoted by  ( δ 1 ,  u 1 ; …  δ n ,  u n ) . We sometimes abuse 
notation and let  U i denote the corresponding  ( δ i ,  u i ), so that a society can be denoted 
by  U = ( U 1 , … ,  U n ) ∈   n .
We emphasize that requiring individuals to consume the same stream (such as a 
household deciding on how to budget consumption across time) leads to stronger 
results, as further allowing individuals to decide on how to divide up consumption 
among themselves exacerbates conflicts in preferences making inconsistencies eas-
ier to derive.12
II. Utilitarian Aggregation of Preferences and Present Bias
We begin by showing that the most prominent class of collective utility functions, 
weighted utilitarian functions, necessarily exhibits present bias; a sort of time incon-
sistency that matches some evidence on behavior.
A collective utility function is a weighted utilitarian function if there exist weights 
w i ∈ [0, 1] such that  ∑ i  w i = 1 and
   V(C) =  ∑ 
i
 w i U i (C). 
The weights  w i can correspond to the fraction of the population with each partic-
ular utility function, or to factors used to trace out the Pareto frontier. For example, 
if  w i is proportional to  1 −  δ i  ____n , then  V(C) corresponds to the average (normalized) 
discounted utilities across the population. Thus,  V(C) is often an object of interest 
in applied work.
9 The assumption that timed consumption is uniformly bounded will assure that net present values are always 
well-defined (for well-behaved instantaneous utility functions). The assumption that it is bounded by  0 and  1 is 
without loss of generality. Finite-horizon problems can be considered via strings that have only finitely many 
positive entries.
10 This specification of time discounted additively separable utility clearly precludes certain sorts of comple-
mentarities in consumption across periods. Nonetheless, it is still important to understand its properties as it is so 
standard in the literature, partly because of its time consistency properties and partly because the complementarities 
are often secondary.
11 For notational convenience, we ignore the normalization factors such as dividing by ( {1 −  δ i } i ).
12 See Zuber (2011) for an examination of settings in which all individuals consume their own streams.
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Utilitarian functions can lead to very familiar “non-standard” preferences, as the 
following two examples illustrate.
Example 1 (Hyperbolic Discounting): Consider a society with a continuum of 
agents13 with  δ i = i , where  i is uniformly distributed on  (0, 1) . All agents share an 
identical instantaneous utility function,  u i = u .
In this simple case, the resulting utilitarian collective utility function is
   V(C) =  ∑ 
t
 ∫   
 
 δ i  t u( c t ) di =  ∑ 
t
 ∫   
 
 i t u( c t ) di 
or
   V(C) =  ∑ 
t
  u( c t ) ____
1 + t . 
Thus, a society with uniformly distributed discount factors generates a utilitarian 
collective utility function that is exactly hyperbolic.14,15
Example 2 (Fixed Costs of Delay): Consider a society of two types of agents. One 
type of agent is completely impetuous:  δ 1 = 0 and  u 1 ( c t ) = a for any  c t > 0 .16 
This type of agent simply wants immediate gratification, and is insensitive to the 
amount of immediate consumption. The other type of agent is standard, with a dis-
count factor  δ 2 > 0 and instantaneous utility  u 2 , an increasing function. Let  λ be 
the proportion of impetuous agents. The resulting utilitarian collective function is
   V(C) =  ∑ 
t
 λ δ 1 t u 1 ( c t ) + (1 − λ) δ 2 t u 2 ( c t ) 
or
   V(C) =  { λa + (1 − λ) ∑ t 
  δ 2 t u 2 ( c t )   if  c 1 > 0,    (1 − λ) ∑ t   δ 2 t u 2 ( c t )  otherwise.
This society exhibits a collective utility function that has a fixed cost of delaying any 
immediate consumption, but exhibits exponential discounting thereafter, matching the 
model and array of experiments presented by Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010).
13 This moves outside of our finite model, but can be easily approximated with finite settings.
14 We note that we did not normalize each agent’s utility (with the factors  {1 −  δ i } ). In terms of normalized 
discounted utility, this formulation effectively puts greater weight on agents that are more patient. Normalizing 
provides a variation on the functional form, but with similar induced behavior.
15 This example is reminiscent of a model analyzed by Souzou (1998), who illustrated how uncertainty over 
exponential hazard rates can generate hyperbolic discounting. Relatedly, Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) noted that 
uncertainty about future rewards may translate into an apparent present-bias. Xue (2008) shows that aggregation in 
a two person model can exhibit some quasi-hyperbolic features.
16 Again, this sits at the extreme of our model as we assume that  δ i > 0 and  u i is increasing, but is easily 
approximated within the model.
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As we now show, a present bias is inherent to any utilitarian aggregation of het-
erogeneous time preferences.
Let  C x t denote a consumption stream with  c t = x and  c  t ′  = 0 for  t ′ ≠ t .
Present-biased Collective Utility Functions.—A collective utility function is 
present biased if:
	 •	 	 V( C x t) ≤ V ( C y t′ ) implies  V ( C x t+1 ) ≤ V ( C y t′+1 ) for any  x, y , and  t′ > t ≥ 1 , 
but the reverse implication sometimes fails:
	 •	 	For	 any	  t′ > t ≥ 1 there exist  x and  y such that  V ( C x t+1 ) < V ( C y t′+1 ) 
while  V( C x t) > V ( C y t′ ) .
Present bias indicates more impatience as the relevant consumption becomes more 
immediate. The first part of the definition states that if one level of consumption at 
some time  t′ is preferred to another at an earlier time  t , then the same preference 
ordering holds when both consumptions are postponed, so that future preferences 
are at least as patient. The second part of the definition indicates that there exist 
some choices that reverse themselves over time: if offered today the immediate con-
sumption is preferred, while if deferred to some point in the future the choice corre-
sponds to more patience (a description going back to Strotz 1955 and corresponding 
to the impulsiveness suggested by Ainslie 1975).
PROPOSITION 1: If  u i = u for all  i and  V is a weighted utilitarian function with 
weights  w i > 0 and  w j > 0 for at least two agents  i and  j such that  δ i ≠  δ j , then 
V is present biased.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Suppose the group of  n agents 
is characterized by the sequence of discount factors  δ 1 <  δ 2 < ⋯ <  δ n . The 
effective discount factor of period  t consumption in the collective utility is given by 
w 1 δ 1 t−1 +  w 2 δ 2 t−1 + ⋯ +  w n δ n t−1 . For simplicity, assume that all the weights are 
positive,  w i > 0 for all  i . As  t increases,
   
 w 1 δ 1 t +  w 2 δ 2 t + ⋯ +  w n δ n t  ________________________  w 1 δ 1 t−1 +  w 2 δ 2 t−1 + ⋯ +  w n δ n t−1 →  δ n . 
Thus, as  t grows agents with greater patience gain implicit importance in deter-
mining the rates of substitution across time, and the collective utility exhibits more 
patience, and hence a present bias.17
17 The analysis carries over to an even more general class of collective utility functions that take as inputs 
the net present values assessed by the group of individuals, including collective utilities that result from Nash 
bargaining, which weight individual utilities multiplicatively. Indeed, for any (smooth) functional  F[ U 1 , … ,  U n ], 
the corresponding marginal rate of substitution between periods  t and  t + 1 is  
 ∑ i  δ i tu′( c t+1 ) ∂ F ___∂ U i    ____________ ∑ i  δ i t−1 u′( c t ) ∂ F ___∂ U i  
. As long as the 
sensitivity of  F to different agents is not too extreme, this will also converge to weighting only the most patient 
agents as  t grows. In Jackson and Yariv (2014) we show that time inconsistency is endemic to all non-dictatorial 
rules that respect unanimity. 
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The proposition implies that whenever a heterogeneous group of individuals 
(or a collection of temporal motives within one individual) determines choices by 
 selecting a Pareto efficient alternative (maximizing a weighted sum of individual 
utility functions), a present bias ensues.
Averaging discount factors has further implications relevant for modeling repre-
sentative agents as well as for econometric estimations of preferences. As noted by a 
number of authors following Marglin (1963) and Feldstein (1964), a weighted util-
itarian function would appear to have a time-dependent exponential discount factor, 
where the value of the implicit discount factor at time  t is given by18
   δ ˆ t ≡  [ ∑ i  w i δ i t] 
1/t . 
We then see that this implicit discount factor increases with time: For  t 1 >  t 2 , 
given that  x  t 2 / t 1  is concave, it follows from Jensen’s inequality that
   δ ˆ  t 2  =  [ ∑ i  w i δ i 
 t 2  ] 
1/ t 2  =  [ ∑ i  w i ( δ i  t 1  ) 
 t 2 / t 1  ] 
1/ t 2  ≤  [ ∑ i  w i δ i 
 t 1  ] 
1/ t 1  =  δ ˆ  t 1  . 
Therefore, in concordance with the present bias that is innate to averaging of prefer-
ences, effective exponential discount factors increase with time.19
III. Collective Time Preferences in the Laboratory
We conducted a set of experiments designed to elicit social preferences over joint 
consumption streams and to inspect whether social planners in the lab exhibit time 
inconsistency.
A. A Methodological Point on Experiments with Time Preference
There are several challenges in eliciting time preferences in the lab. First, explicitly 
delaying payments to subjects does not necessarily map into delayed changes in their 
consumption levels. Instead, the delays may simply affect their cash flow. Delayed 
payments can be substituted for by shifting existing wealth across time at the subject’s 
interest rate on savings. Therefore, measured discount factors may simply reflect the 
interest rates and/or borrowing constraints that subjects face, which may be nonsta-
tionary. This concern is particularly strong when rewards are monetary.
Second, agents may be uncertain about their preferences for cash in the future, 
introducing risk and uncertainty as confounds, especially for college students who 
frequently face cash constraints and uncertainty about their expenses.20
18 Estimating an average discount rate from a distribution  G on  [0, 1] while not accounting for heterogeneity 
may lead an econometrician to assess the  t ′ th moment of the distribution,  E G ( δ t ), rather than the expected discount 
to the  t th power,  [ E G (δ)] t . 
19 This is consistent with the experimentally observed sub-additivity (see Read 2001) in which discounting over 
a delay is greater when the delay is divided into subintervals than when it is left undivided. 
20 Uncertainty about how/whether subjects will be paid by the experimenter in the future can be mitigated 
through careful design (for instance, see Andreoni and Sprenger 2012a and Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter 2010). 
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Third, in the context of our design, the possibility that some subjects are indi-
vidually time inconsistent poses an additional challenge for our main experimental 
goal. Our focus is on how aggregation relates to time inconsistency, and so we wish 
to begin with time-consistent underlying preferences and measure the inconsistency 
that emerges from aggregation. Thus, we wish to induce and control the underlying 
individual preferences to isolate the effects of aggregation.
Finally, subjects’ organic time preferences are unpredictable from the experi-
menter’s perspective and could potentially be rather narrow for the time horizons 
that are feasible in a lab setting (even with delayed payments).21 This would limit 
our ability to test aggregation of an assortment of different time preferences, which 
is relevant for economic decisions that have long horizons.
Taking all of these points together, directly controlling subjects’ individual base 
preferences becomes essential. This led us to develop a new elicitation technique, 
aimed at inducing and controlling individual discount factors, while maintaining the 
nature of the trade-offs featured in aggregation, as we now describe.
B. “As-if” Consumption Streams
To represent streams of consumption at three different times we used combina-
tions of tokens of three different colors. Instead of a subject receiving some amount 
of consumption today, some amount  t periods from now, and some amount  t′ periods 
from now, the subject would receive some amount of blue tokens, some amount of 
red tokens, and some amount of gray tokens. We then induced a discount factor by 
having different exchange rates for tokens into cash, depending on their color.
To induce a discount factor of  δ , we paid a subject one cent for each blue token, 
δ cents for each red token, and  δ 2 cents for each gray token. For instance, a subject 
with an assigned discount factor of  δ = 0.9 would get 1 cent for each blue token, 
0.9 cents for each red token, and 0.81 cents for each gray token. If, for example, such 
a subject were faced with a choice between a stream of tokens  C = (105, 0, 0) of 
blue, red, and gray tokens, respectively (so 105 blue tokens and none of the other 
colors), and another of  C′ = (0, 160, 0) (so 160 red tokens), the stream  C would be 
worth  105 cents to the subject and  C′ would be worth  0.9 × 160 = 144 cents. In 
particular,  C ′ would offer a greater overall payoff.
This does not explicitly involve timing. Nonetheless, it involves exactly the same 
calculations that we assume agents make in standard economic models, and in the 
experiments this allows us to isolate how subjects aggregate these preferences. In 
particular, it allows us to gain insights on the impact of a wide range of discount 
factor combinations, which would be difficult using organic time preferences of 
subjects as that would require us to either run very large experiments (to get many 
combinations of discount factors), or introduce many long time horizons to cre-
ate substantial heterogeneities; and these would still face the difficulties mentioned 
earlier of eliciting actual time preferences and not other confounds that are very 
21 For instance, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), who, with monetary rewards, observe insignificant time incon-
sistency in individual preferences, estimate preferences assuming CRRA utilities. The resulting annual discount rates 
vary between  0.246 and  0.377, depending on specification, with standard errors varying between  0.064 and  0.173. In 
any reasonable experimental horizon, these estimates would translate into rather narrow regions of discount factors. 
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likely to be present with long horizons.22 Nonetheless, as mentioned, this technique 
does not involve the explicit time framing and any of its “psychological” cognitive 
implications. In that sense, our experimental tests are ones inspecting how individ-
uals aggregate sequences of payments that involve discounting, but not a direct test 
of how people behave when faced with time-based choices. This also allows us to 
isolate the aggregation issue by imposing actual exponential discounting on the base 
preferences and then examining biases that result in the aggregation.
Under this construction, the choice between  C and  C ' becomes clear as the payoff 
values to subjects are then simple multiplications of the induced discount factors 
times the relevant numbers of blue, red, and gray tokens. In order to further focus on 
aggregation, we also presented the subjects with the net present values rather than 
the tokens and discount factors, and then checked that choices coincided under the 
two different presentations. Direct presentation of net present values allows us to 
avoid behaviors that are driven by simple calculation errors. In particular, to check 
that these two different presentations were functionally equivalent we ran, as a con-
trol, several complementary sessions in which choices were presented as explicit 
“time” (token) streams with discount factors. Subjects made choices that were sta-
tistically indistinguishable across the two types of experimental framings.23
C. Details of the Design
Subjects made a series of decisions over two alternative consumption “streams,” 
such as the streams  C and  C′ described above.
Every subject made a choice in each round between two different consump-
tion streams. These consumption streams were for a group that did not include 
the chooser. So, the chooser was determining a payoff profile for a group of three 
subjects, call them members 1, 2, and 3. For instance, one of the choices subjects 
were faced with was between streams  C = (105, 0, 0) and  C′ = (0, 160, 0) . For 
that choice, if group member 1 was assigned a discount factor of  0.2 and group 
member 2 a discount factor of  0.9 , then the present discounted values of  C and  C′ 
for these two members would be  U 1 (C) =  U 2 (C) = 105 , and  U 1 (C′ ) = 32 and 
 U 2 (C′ ) = 144 . Each group also had a third member whose payoff was generally the 
same across the two choices, in this case set to  80 for both choices.24 The chooser 
22 Note also that the translation into the exponential discounting setting studied by Koopmans (1960) is straight-
forward when colored tokens are translated into timed consumption, with the order naturally induced by the tokens’ 
values. For instance, time consistency would imply that  x blue tokens are preferred to  y red tokens if and only if  x 
red tokens are preferred to  y gray tokens. 
23 We ran several auxiliary sessions (with  64 subjects) in which  20 choices were presented as streams of dis-
counted units. These, by and large, correspond to the choices reported upon in the body of the paper in which only 
subjects for whom the alternatives affected payoffs participated. These auxiliary sessions were run using choices 
that involved groups of only two individuals (mainly in order to assure the interface was not too loaded with infor-
mation as each alternative now entailed three numbers, corresponding to the number of tokens of each color, for 
each subject). In these sessions subjects’ choices affected their own payoffs. Subjects could send messages to one 
another and, upon arriving at a consensus, the corresponding choice was implemented and the resulting total payoffs 
(the effective net present values) were given. (See instructions in the online materials.) We also ran identical ses-
sions (with  30 subjects), with two subjects arriving at a consensus that was then implemented, in which alternatives 
were presented as net present values, much as in the paper. Using a test of proportions, none but one of the choices 
leads to significantly different choices (the only choice leading to a  p -value lower than  10 percent when the tested 
hypothesis is that the samples are identical). 
24 The third member was included since we also allowed for some choices inherently related to groups of three 
in order to check for intransitivities, rather than time consistencies. Those relate to additional theories from Jackson 
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was faced with a decision between  C or  C′ , leading to present-discounted payoffs 
of  (105, 105, 80) from  C for the three members of the group, or  (32, 144, 80) for  C′ .
In terms of payments, only one member of the group was actually randomly 
selected to be paid. In particular, we would randomly match two subjects  A and  B . 
Then  A was randomly assigned a role as one of  B ’s group members (and  B was assigned 
a role as one of some other subject’s group). If Subject  A was randomly assigned the 
role of Member  x, then  A was to be paid based on what Member  x should receive 
according to subject  B ’s allocation choice. Subjects were simply told that their deci-
sion would affect a randomly chosen other subject who would be randomly assigned 
to one of the three roles. Subjects were randomly re-assigned at the end of each round. 
Subjects were told their cumulative payoffs (and only their own) after each round.
Subjects interacted only through the computerized interface. Two practice rounds 
were followed by a number of rounds of actual choice (choices are listed in Table 1 
below).25 Each of the 38 choices subjects faced was comprised of three payoffs, 
to the three potential members. When comparing two such alternatives, there are 
three dimensions of the alternatives that may conceivably play an important role in 
choice: the sum of payoffs, the distribution of payoffs, and the marginal differences 
between alternatives for each of the subjects. We designed the set of payoffs to vary 
on these three dimensions.
The experiments were conducted at the California Social Sciences Experimental 
Laboratory (CASSEL) at UCLA with 60 subjects participating in six separate ses-
sions. Subjects were paid the sum of payoffs throughout the rounds, averaging $39, 
in addition to a show-up fee of $5.26
D. Time Inconsistency
Several choices subjects faced corresponded to choices between two consump-
tion streams and their delayed version. For instance, suppose group member 1 was 
assigned a discount factor of  0.2 and group member 2 a discount factor of  0.9 . 
First, consider a choice between the streams  C = (105, 0, 0) and  C ′ = (0, 160, 0) . 
The present discounted values of  C and  C′ for these two members would be 
 U 1 (C) =  U 2 (C) = 105 , and  U 1 (C′ ) = 32 and  U 2 (C′ ) = 144 . The delayed 
decision is then between streams  C″ = (0, 105, 0) versus  C‴ = (0, 0, 160) , 
and Yariv (2014). The intransitivities appeared quite prevalently and almost exactly in line with the theory (partic-
ularly in auxiliary experiments in which agents explicitly voted on which consumption streams would be chosen). 
For the sake of space we do not report them here; but we kept with three members per group in order to keep the 
interface similar for the subjects throughout the experiments. For time inconsistencies we only need two different 
time preferences, and so we simply set the third member’s payoffs to be constant across the decision to effectively 
eliminate that member’s payoffs from the decision process. 
25 Our full instructions are available in the online materials.
26 Choices were shuffled in order to avoid framing effects, and so note that the orders of the decisions in the data 
in the online materials differ from Table 1. In order to control for the ordering of choices, there were two experi-
mental sessions. In one session, of  36 subjects (that we split into three separate groups for payment purposes, so 
that behavior is fully independent across them) subjects faced  14 paid choices (in addition to two practice ones). 
In the second session there were  24 subjects (that we again split into three separate groups for payment purposes). 
These subjects faced  38 paid choices (in addition to the two practice ones). Furthermore, the  14 paid choices of the 
first session were the last  14 paid choices in the second session. There were no significant differences between the 
observed selections made by the two sets of subjects (using proportions tests to compare the choices within the two 
samples). In what follows we report observations aggregated across these sessions, with most of the analysis based 
on the 14 choices common across the sessions so that there are 60 subjects. 
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which induce present discounted utilities of  U 1 (C″) = 21 and  U 2 (C″) = 95 , and 
 U 1 (C‴) = 6 and  U 2 (C‴) = 130 . In each group we also had a third member whose 
payoff was often the same across the two choices, in this case  80 for all four choic-
es.27 Thus, in terms of profiles of present discounted utilities corresponding to the 
streams these become  (105, 105, 80) for  C and  (32, 144, 80) for  C′ ; and  (21, 95, 80) 
for  C″ and  (6, 130, 80) for  C‴ . In fact, this pair of choices corresponded to choices 
1 and  2 in our experiments. A subject would be present biased just with respect to 
these two choices if he or she picked  C over  C′ and then  C‴ over  C″ (as more than 
a third of the subjects did). Similarly, choices 3–6 corresponded to similar pairs in 
27 The third member was included since we also allowed for some choices inherently related to groups of three 
in order to check for intransitivities. The intransitivities appeared quite prevalently and almost exactly in line with 
the theory (particularly in auxiliary experiments in which agents explicitly voted on which consumption streams 
would be chosen). For the sake of presentation space we do not report them here; but we kept with three members 
per group in order to keep the interface similar throughout. 
Table 1—The List of Choices (in Terms of Present Discounted Utility Profiles) 
and Subjects’ Selections
Choice Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 1 Chosen
1 (105, 105, 80) (32, 144, 80) 83%
2 (21, 95, 80) (6, 130, 80) 47%
3 (125, 85, 80) (52, 124, 80) 78%
4 (41, 75, 80) (26, 110, 80) 27%
5 (145, 65, 80) (72, 104, 80) 83%
6 (61, 55, 80) (46, 90, 80) 34%
7 (165, 45, 80) (92, 84, 80) 38%
8 (81, 35, 80) (66, 70, 80) 33%
9 (125, 85, 80) (32, 144, 80) 83%
10 (21, 95, 80) (16, 120, 80) 53%
11 (165, 45, 80) (32, 144, 80) 41%
12 (21, 95, 80) (26, 100, 80) 17%
13 (185, 25, 80) (32, 144, 80) 82%
14 (21, 95, 80) (46, 90, 80) 25%
15 (250, 170, 80) (104, 248, 80) 87%
16 (82, 150, 80) (52, 220, 80) 29%
17 (290, 130, 80) (144, 208, 80) 80%
18 (122, 110, 80) (92, 180, 80) 37%
19 (53, 95, 80) (130, 40, 80) 37%
20 (53, 74, 80) (40, 78, 80) 75%
21 (105, 105, 105) (30,  210, 105) 62%
22 (105, 105, 105) (70, 170, 105) 58%
23 (105, 105, 105) (110, 130, 105) 33%
24 (105, 105, 105) (29, 245, 105) 46%
25 (105, 105, 105) (77, 197, 105) 21%
26 (105, 105, 105) (125, 149, 105) 21%
27 (125, 85, 125) (52, 124, 52) 83%
28 (125, 85, 85) (52, 124, 124) 29%
29 (41, 75, 41) (26, 110, 26) 67%
30 (41, 75, 75) (26, 110, 110) 21%
31 (145, 65, 65) (72, 104, 104) 21%
32 (61, 55, 61) (46, 90, 46) 42%
33 (105, 105, 150) (32, 144, 150) 62%
34 (21, 95, 150) (6, 130, 150) 25%
35 (125, 85, 150) (52, 124, 150) 92%
36 (41, 75, 150) (26, 110, 150) 25%
37 (145, 65, 150) (72, 104, 150) 75%
38 (61, 55, 150) (46, 90, 150) 21%
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which we considered different initial wealths for members  1 and  2 that were affected 
by the planner’s selection (see Table 1).
These choices allow us to distinguish time-consistent planners (who make cor-
responding selections in the original and delayed choice problems), present-biased 
planners (who sometimes choose the immediate smaller consumption, but the larger 
delayed consumption when all consumption is delayed), future-biased planners (pick-
ing delayed consumptions initially, but more immediate rewards when both choices 
are delayed), and planners who do not fall squarely into any of the above categories.
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of individuals based on this classification. A large 
majority,  75 percent of individuals, are present biased, while less than  2 percent 
(only one subject) are time consistent, and the remaining are either future-biased 
or showing mixed inconsistencies.28 These results are very unlikely to arise from 
subjects randomly making selections. Indeed, Figure 1 also depicts the expected 
distribution of types were individuals selecting each choice in a pair with a proba-
bility of  0.5, which is significantly different from the observed distribution with any 
reasonable levels of statistical confidence.29
28 These categories were based on comparing decisions where the same decisions were made with different time 
perspectives. Present bias was assigned if a subject sometimes made decisions which exhibited present bias (for 
example, picking  C over  C′ and then  C‴ over  C″ in the above described choices which were in the decision set) and 
never the reverse. Future bias indicated that the reverse was true, so that subjects sometimes chose the reverse of 
the present biased decisions and never chose in a present biased manner. Time consistency indicates that the same 
decisions were always made regardless of whether the alternatives in a choice were delayed; and mixed inconsis-
tencies captures the remaining subjects.
29 Furthermore, the probability of achieving at least  75 percent present-biased individuals under random choice 
is of the magnitude of  10 −28 .
Figure 1. Frequency of Individuals of Different Time Consistency Types
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E. Social Planners’ Collective Utility Functions
As mentioned, the choices we offered subjects were designed to distinguish the 
ways in which planners made choices, including pairs of consumption streams that 
varied in the sum of payoffs, the distribution of payoffs, and the marginal differ-
ences between alternatives.
Specifically, we designed the choice problems to distinguish between the three 
most prominent ways from the welfare literature in which planners might evaluate 
alternatives: based on the sum of utilities across agents (utilitarianism), based on 
maximizing the minimum utility (maximin or a “Rawlsian” approach), or based on 
some weighting of the distribution of payoffs (some form of egalitarianism), say the 
minimization of the standard deviation of payoffs.30
Table 2 illustrates how the choices faced by subjects distinguish these motives. 
Table 2 contains four choices that differed in terms of which selection a subject 
would make if they were using a different sort of collective utility function, the type 
of objective that would lead to a selection of either alternative, and the correspond-
ing experimental frequencies with which the first alternative was selected.31
The table illustrates that when all three objectives lead to the same alternatives 
(the first and fourth choice pairs), most of the subjects followed those prescriptions 
( 83  percent in both cases). In the case where the prescriptions under utilitarian-
ism and egalitarianism diverge (Choice 2), there is a substantial split in the deci-
sions of the subjects. However, in the choice that differed only in the prescription of 
maximin (Choice 3) compared to utilitarianism and inequality aversion, the pattern 
looks (statistically) indistinguishable from the case where all three lead to the same 
alternative (Choice 4). Indeed, as the bottom two choices of Table 2 illustrate, the 
choices in which both utilitarian and egalitarian motives would push agents toward 
selecting the second alternative, but maximin motives would generate diverse deci-
sions, differed in only  4 percent of subjects.32 Thus, in what follows, we consider 
collective utility functions that depend on the sum and distribution of payoffs.
30 The analysis that follows does not change qualitatively if we consider egalitarian motives that depend on the 
variance or absolute differences of payoffs.
31 These choices correspond to choices  1, 2, 38, and  12 in our design, see Table 1.
32 Aggregate discrete-choice regression analysis in which selections were explained by the sum of payoffs, the 
variance of payoffs, and the maximin of payoffs, led to similar observations regarding the relative importance of 
the sum and variance of payoffs.
Table 2—Choices Distinguishing between 
Three Prominent Collective Utility Functions
Profile of payoffs
Types of planner 
preferences preferring Percent choosing
Choice 1 C (105, 105, 80) M, I, U 83
C′ (32, 144, 80) 17
Choice 2 C (21, 95, 80) M, I 47
C′ (6, 130, 80) U 53
Choice 3 C (61, 55, 150) M 21
C′ (46, 90, 150) I, U 79
Choice 4 C (21, 95, 80) 17
C′ (26, 100, 80) M, I, U 83
Note: (U1, U2, U3); M = Maximin; I = Inequality; U = Utilitarian
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A family of collective utility functions that incorporates utilitarianism and 
inequality aversion is one that evaluates an alternative according to
(2)   a × Mean of Payoffs − (1 − a) ×  Standard Deviation of Payoffs, 
where  a ∈  [0, 1] . Thus,  a serves as a weight of how much a planner cares about 
utilitarian concerns relative to distributional ones.33
For each subject and for each specification of the parameter  a, we can calculate 
the fraction of decisions that would be implied by the maximization of (2) and 
coincide with that subject’s observed selections. We call that fraction the individual 
score. For each  a , the overall score is the average over all individual subject scores.
We allow for heterogeneity in the  a parameters that best describe subjects. In par-
ticular, we considered different numbers of “types” that describe the subjects. A type 
is characterized by a range of parameters  a that all lead to the same predictions (given 
the finite number of alternatives, not all  a parameters are distinguished). So, if we just 
allow for one type, we find the single  a that best fits all of the decisions by all of the 
subjects. If we allow for two types, we look for two different  a parameters that best 
describe the decisions of all of the subjects, when each subject must be assigned to 
one of the two different  a parameters and so forth. So, for each number of types  k , we 
look for a partition of the subject population into  k groups and a value of  a for each 
group in the partition that maximizes overall scores. Table 3 presents the values of the 
best fitting (ranges of)  a parameters for each number of types  k , and the corresponding 
average score for individuals of each type.
In terms of preference parameters, assuming all subjects have the same collective 
utility function leads to an estimated parameter  a of  0.75. 34 However, allowing 
for more than one type of collective utility function among the subjects leads to a 
substantial fraction of individuals (between  15 percent–25 percent ) who put very 
little weight on utilitarian concerns and care mostly about the variation in payoffs. 
Regardless of the number of types fitted, more than three quarters of the population 
has a taste parameter  a that is  0.7 or higher (using the midpoint if an interval of 
parameters fits equally well for a subject). Thus, although most subjects are best fit 
by having some weight on inequality, many weight it in a minor way. Nonetheless, 
a minority of subjects appear to weight inequality much more substantially. We 
note, however, that the types with lower utilitarian incentives were characterized by 
a lower overall score, suggesting that our model of planners’ objectives better fits 
subjects who place greater weight on utilitarian motives.35
In Figure 2, we present the best fitting score for each type, as dependent on 
the number of types. When the possible number of types is  60 (the number of 
33 As mentioned before, the results are quantitatively similar when using the sum of absolute differences 
between payoffs instead of the standard deviation of payoffs, and both offer slightly better fits than those derived by 
using variance instead of standard deviation, which is more nonlinear in the level of inequality. 
34 We note that if subjects only cared about efficiency, then  a = 1, corresponding to a score of about  71 per-
cent, or approximately  29 percent probability of errors in prediction. If subjects only cared about the standard 
deviation of payoffs, then  a = 0, and the score would fall to around  49 percent (approximately the score one would 
expect from random choice), corresponding to  51 percent prediction errors.
35 The score is still substantially higher than the  50 percent expected score generated by random selections. 
We note that it is possible that some subjects had objectives that accounted for multiple choices made, rather than 
viewing each choice on the margin. Although much of the variation in behavior is captured by objective functions 
that consider each choice in isolation, broader objectives are an important consideration for further research.
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subjects), each subject could have an individual  a, and so the derived score is the 
maximal feasible one under this model and is  82 percent . As can be seen in the 
figure, allowing for  5 or  6 types yields scores that are not substantially lower. On 
the other extreme, assuming the population is completely homogeneous, leads to 
a lower score of approximately  72 percent . 
To conclude, our experimental results are in line with the theory in that, with 
almost no exceptions (59 out of 60) experimental planners are time inconsistent, 
with three quarters of them exhibiting choices that are present biased. Furthermore, 
planners in these experiments generally act in ways that are  consistent with a 
Figure 2. Score as a Function of the Number of Types
Table 3—Best Fitting Utilitarian-Egalitarian Preferences by Number of Types
Number of types Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 Type 6
1 Best fit “a” range 0.75
 Percent of this type (100)
Score 0.72
2 Best fit “a” range 0–0.25 0.95–1
 Percent of this type (25) (75)
Score 0.67 0.80
3 Best fit “a” range 0–0.25 0.75 0.95–1
 Percent of this type (21) (40) (39)
Score 0.66 0.79 0.86
4 Best fit “a” range 0–0.25 0.7 0.75 0.95–1
 Percent of this type (17) (18) (27) (38)
Score 0.66 0.82 0.81 0.86
5 Best fit “a” range 0–0.25 0.55 0.7 0.75 0.95–1
Percent of this type (15) (7) (14) (26) (38)
Score 0.6449 0.7968 0.838 0.814 0.8653
6 Best fit “a” range 0–0.25 0.55 0.7 0.75 0.85 0.95–1
Percent of this type (15) (7) (13) (25) (17) (23)
Score 0.64 0.80 0.84 0.82 0.88 0.85
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 combination of utilitarian and equality-sensitive motives, with a large fraction 
putting a substantial weight on the utilitarian attributes of alternatives. Recall that 
Proposition 1 implied that whenever utilitarian motives guide decisions, behavior 
will be present biased. In that sense, the preference characterization of our experi-
mental social planners is in line with the prevalent present bias observed in the lab.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Our starting point is the theoretical observation that whenever there is some het-
erogeneity in the population, utilitarian aggregation exhibits present bias, where 
choices appear to correspond to increasing patience over time. These results 
are confirmed by an array of experimental results. Social planners in the lab put 
high weights on utilitarian motives and, in accordance, three quarters of subjects 
exhibit time inconsistencies that take the form of present bias. Thus, utilitarian 
policy makers who care about some proxy of (utilitarian) efficiency will be pres-
ent biased. In addition, the results suggest that even when estimated preferences 
pertaining to groups (say, households) exhibit time inconsistencies, they may arise 
from  heterogeneous but time-consistent individual preferences. Therefore, welfare 
 maximization requires a careful analysis with the primitive preferences taken into 
account, rather than a simple substitution with a non-existent representative agent.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Without loss of generality, we normalize all utility functions so that  u i (0) = 0 
for all  i .
We prove a stronger version of Proposition 1.
A collective utility function is a generalized weighted utilitarian function if there 
exist weights  w i ∈ [0, 1] such that  ∑ i  w i = 1 and
   V(C) = F ( ∑ i w i U i (C)) , 
where  F is an increasing function.
PROPOSITION 1*: If  u i = u for all  i where  u is continuous and strictly increas-
ing, and  V is a generalized weighted utilitarian function with weights  w i > 0 and 
w j > 0 for at least two agents  i and  j such that  δ i ≠  δ j , then  V is present-biased.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1*:
By the definition of a generalized weighted utilitarian function and the conditions 
of the proposition, we can write
   V(C[x, t]) = F ( ∑ i w i δ i t−1 u(x)) . 
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To see the first part of the definition of present-bias, note that  V( C x t) ≥ V( C y  t + k ) 
implies that
   ∑ 
i
  w i δ i t−1 u(x) ≥  ∑ 
i
  w i δ i t+k−1 u(y). 
If  u(x) = 0 then  u(y) = 0 and from monotonicity,  x = y = 0 and all time evalua-
tions are identical. Suppose then that  u(x) > 0. The above inequality can be written as
   
 ∑ i   w i δ i t−1 ________   ∑ i   w i δ i t+k−1 ≥  
u(y) ___
u(x) . 
We show that
   
 ∑ i   w i δ i t−1 ________   ∑ i   w i δ i t+k−1 
is decreasing in  t .
Note that the derivative of this expression is
   
 ( ∑ i   w i ln ( δ i ) δ i t−1 )  ( ∑ i   w i δ i t+k−1 ) −  ( ∑ i   w i ln ( δ i ) δ i t+k−1 )  ( ∑ i   w i δ i t−1 )        _________________________________________
 ( ∑ i   w i δ i t) 2 
 . 
The numerator can be written as
   ∑ 
i
 ∑ 
j
 ln ( δ i ) w i w j δ i t−1 δ j t−1 ( δ j k −  δ i k ) , 
which we can rewrite as
   ∑ 
i, j : i<j
  w i w j  δ i t−1 δ j t−1 (ln ( δ i ) − ln ( δ j )) ( δ j k −  δ i k ) , 
and each of the expressions in this summand is positive whenever  w i w j δ i t−1 δ j t−1 ≠ 0 
and  δ j ≠  δ i , and is zero otherwise.
This implies that
   
 ∑ i   w i δ i t−2 _______   ∑ i   w i δ i t+k−2 ≥  
u(y) ___
u(x), 
or that  V( C x t − 1 ) ≥ V( C y t+k−1 ) and so the first part of the definition of present-bias 
is satisfied.
Next, given that  u is continuous and increasing, and  u(0) = 0 (recall that all 
utility functions are so normalized), we can find  x and  y such that
   u(x) =  ∑ 
i
  w i δ i k u(y). 
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Given that  w i > 0 and  w j > 0 for some  δ i ≠  δ j , it follows, as shown already, that
   
 ∑ i   w i δ i t _______ ∑ i   w i δ i t+1  
is strictly decreasing in  t . Therefore, iterative application of the above implies that
   ∑ 
i
 w i δ i tu(x) <  ∑ 
i
 w i δ i t+k u(y) 
for all  t ≥ 1 . By continuity of  u , we can then find some  ε such that
   u(x + ε) >  ∑ 
i
 w i δ i k u(y) and  ∑ 
i
 w i δ i tu(x + ε) <  ∑ 
i
 w i δ i t+k u(y) 
for all  t ≥ 1 . This establishes the second part of the definition of present-bias.
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